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Introduction
This article explores opportunities for interaction 
between Georgians and Abkhaz. Recommendations are 
based on the belief that private sector representatives are 
well suited to take a cooperative approach to engagement 
and that, even in the most intractable conflicts, the 
private sector is primarily interested in market access 
and a stable environment for doing business. The article 
does not address questions regarding the political status 
of Abkhazia nor does it explore security arrangements. 
Politics and security are considered only to the extent that 
they impact economic issues.
History/Context
Abkhazia, a territory located on the Black Sea in the 
northwest corner of Georgia, broke away from Tbilisi's 
control after the conflict of 1992-93. More than 250,000 
ethnic Georgians were driven from their homes in 
violence that the international community characterized 
as “ethnic cleansing.” The conflict remained frozen until 
the war between Georgia and Russia in 2008.
After the 2003 “Revolution of Roses” brought 
Preident Mikheil Saakashvili to power, the Government of 
Georgia (GoG) initiated dramatic political and economic 
reforms. Development and democratization were aimed 
in part at advancing the reintegration of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia. Georgia became an economic success 
story. In 2007, Georgia's economy grew 12% from a 
boom in the telecom, construction, transport, financial 
and tourism sectors. Trade increased 39.9% between 
2006 and 2007. Exports increased 32.5% and imports 
by 41% during the same period. Georgia saw an overall 
improvement in its GDP, fiscal balance, current account 
balance, and real exchange rate. Positive structural 
changes included improvements in the banking system, 
position of the central bank and increasing rates of tax 
collection. Foreign direct investment was $1.8 billion in 
2007, a 40% increase from the previous year and 19.8% 
of GDP.1 Georgia also benefited from its membership in
1. Interview by the author with U.S. Ambassador John Tefft in Tbilisi, 
June 18, 2008.
the World Trade Organization, as well as its location on 
the Eurasia Silk Road.
Russia resented Saakashvili's pro-Western positions 
and launched a propaganda and harassment campaign 
aimed at undermining the GoG. It also took steps against 
Georgia's statehood by providing Abkhaz separatists with 
diplomatic and military support. In March 2008, Russia 
withdrew from the CIS declaration banning military 
assistance and imposing sanctions on Abkhazia. It also 
established legal connections between its ministries 
and their counterparts in Abkhazia, opening fifteen new 
checkpoints along the cease-fire line between Georgia 
and Abkhazia.
War between Georgia and Russia erupted on August 
7, 2008. In response to Russian and South Ossetian 
provocations, Saakashvili ordered the shelling and 
deployment of Georgian troops into Tskhinvali, South 
Ossetia's capital. By August 9, Russia's disproportionate 
land, air, and sea assault overwhelmed Georgia's armed 
forces. Operations extended from the port of Poti in the 
west to Gori just 40 km from Tbilisi. Russian forces 
occupied the Kodori Gorge, to the northeast of Abkhazia. 
Ossetian militias, often in collusion with the Russian 
military, burned and looted Georgian villages around 
Tskhinvali.2 Civilian economic costs are estimated at $1.2 
billion.
Acting on behalf of the EU Presidency, France's 
President Nicolas Sarkozy negotiated a ceasefire on 
August 12, 2008. The agreement required a withdrawal 
of forces to pre-war positions and access by humanitarian 
and monitoring missions to the conflict areas. Russia 
has repeatedly violated the ceasefire by, for example, 
refusing to withdraw troops or dismantle checkpoints 
and unilaterally creating a 12 km buffer zone around 
South Ossetia. Citing “new realities,” Russia established 
diplomatic relations with Abkhazia on August 26, 2010. 
Only Russia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Nauru have 
recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Every other
2. Tavernise, Sabrina. “Survivors in Georgia Tell of Ethnic Killings,” 
New York Times. August 19, 2008; C. J. Chivers, “In Battered Vil-
lages, Georgians Speak, if They Dare.” New York Times. August 18, 
2008.
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country views Abkhazia and South Ossetia as part of 
Georgia.
More than $4.5 billion over three years was pledged 
to the GoG at a conference of donors on October 22,
2008. The package consisted of $2 billion in aid and 
$2.5 billion in loans, including an 18-month stand-by 
agreement with the IMF worth $750 million.3 Making 
Georgia one of the largest per capita recipients of foreign 
aid, the U.S. pledged $1.06 billion. Assistance helped 
bolster investor confidence, sustain private capital flows, 
and provide sufficient liquidity to the banking system. It 
also helped the GoG maintain a stable exchange rate and 
adequate level of international reserves.4
Engagement Strategy
The GoG published its “State Strategy on Occupied 
Territories” on January 27, 2010. The State Strategy 
rejects violence as a tool for resolving conflict with 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, or addressing status 
issues. It seeks instead to promote interaction aimed at 
improving the socio-economic conditions on all sides.
The State Strategy and Action Plan provide a 
roadmap for implementing Georgia's “Law on Occupied 
Territories.” Adopted on October 15, 2008, the Law is 
the primary bulwark supporting the GoG's policy of non-
recognition towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The 
Law regulates diplomatic contact, commercial activity, 
travel to the territories, and travel by Abkhaz and 
South Ossetians who do not use Georgian passports. It 
condemns Russia's violation of the ceasefire agreement, 
its refusal to extend the UN Mission Observer in Georgia, 
and the deployment of the Federal Security Service along 
administrative dividing lines, which prevents the EU 
Monitoring Mission from fulfilling its mandate.
By mentioning “Occupied Territories” in its title, 
the State Strategy gives no ground on recognition. Its 
preamble states that the goal of the State Strategy is 
to “reverse the process of annexation by the Russian 
Federation.”5 The State Strategy is a political text 
prepared for multiple audiences including hardliners 
in Georgia, directly affected parties in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, and the international community. While 
text of the State Strategy mirrors the legislative intent 
of the Law on Occupied Territories, the documents have 
different objectives. The State Strategy seeks to engage 
Abkhaz and South Ossetians, while the Law is punitive 
in seeking to isolate them.
3. “Cheney calls on west to rally behind Georgia,” Financial Times, 
September 5, 2008.
4. “IMF Mission Reaches Agreement in Principle on a US$750 Mil-
lion Stand-By Arrangement with Georgia,” IMF, September 3, 2008.
5. State Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement through Coop-
eration, 2010, p. 49.
Archil Gegeshidze, Senior Fellow of the Georgian 
Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, 
commends the State Strategy for “denying coercion and 
offering opportunities to engage in mutually beneficial 
projects.” But he believes “[i]t is badly packaged.” 
Gegeshidze notes, “The Strategy may impress the outside 
world but not the Abkhaz. Georgia needs to openly 
refrain from making claims on territory if it wants the 
Abkhaz to go along.” The State Strategy and subsequent 
Action Plan were rolled out with much fanfare.6
Abkhazia's Economy
Abkhazia covers an area of 8,700 square kilometers.2 
According to the 1989 census, Abkhazia's population 
was 525,000 people, of which Georgians represented 
45.7% and ethnic Abkhaz 17.8%. Other groups included 
Armenians and Russians. After the 1992-93 conflict, 
however, Abkhazia's current population decreased to 
about 180,000.7
In the 1980s, Abkhazia's economy included 500 
industrial enterprises, primarily power engineering and 
machine manufacturing.8 Gagra, with its beautiful white 
sand beaches, was a celebrated tourist destination. Other 
tourist spots included Sukhumi, Gudauta, Pitsunda, 
Lake Ritsa, and Novyi Afon, home to one of the world's 
most beautiful and historic monasteries. After the 1992-
93 conflict, Sukhumi's hospitality industry virtually 
disappeared. Its storied seaside grew dilapidated, its 
coastline polluted, and infrastructure neglected.
Mild and sub-tropical, Abkhazia's economy is 
seasonal with more than 200 sunny days each year. These 
conditions are ideal for citrus, tea, and tobacco, which 
occupy 40% of the land under cultivation. After the 1992-
93 conflict, Abkhazia grew dependent on humanitarian 
assistance and subsistence farming. Accelerated by 
the CIS embargo (1996-2008), Abkhazia's productive 
capacity collapsed. Industrial production decreased 
tenfold; underinvestment and neglect undermined 
Abkhazia's transport and energy infrastructure. The Gali 
district and other parts of Eastern Abkhazia were deserted 
as ethnic Georgians were driven from their homes. Tea, 
citrus and tobacco production plummeted, and poaching 
depleted Abkhazia's rich forests of its chestnut, oak, 
box, and yew stock.9 *According to Abkhaz authorities, 
Abkhazia lost $13 billion as a result of the conflict.
6. Interview by the author with Archil Gegeshidze at the Georgia 
Foundation for International Studies in Tbilisi, May 11, 2010.
7. From War Economies to Peace Economies in the South Caucasus. 
International Alert. 2004. Chapter 4: David Chkhartishvili, Roman 
Gotsiridze and Bessarion Kirsmarishvili, p. 123.
8. Butuzova, Lyudmila, and Roman Mukhametzhanov, “Abkhazia 
Revisited,” Moscow News, no. 36 (September 13, 2007).




Abkhazia's economy is currently rebounding. 
Russia is building roads, expanding the utility grid, 
and developing a water supply system. A new highway 
was recently completed between Sukhumi and southern 
Russia. Abkhazia has functioning ports: Sukhumi, 
Gagra, Gudauta and Ochamchira. Abkhazia's hospitality 
industry is expanding. Abkhazia is also developing 
natural resources, including coal from Tkvarchel. It is 
working with Rosneft to explore oil reserves. Logging 
and agro-industries involving hazelnuts, persimmons 
and viticulture, kiwi also have growth potential.10
Economic Cooperation
The GoG's State Strategy and Action Plan can 
potentially boost Abkhazia's economic recovery. 
Commercial contact can also serve as a tool for conflict 
mitigation, while laying the ground for long-term 
rapprochement between Georgians and Abkhazi. Russia 
would also benefit from regional economic development.
Current and historical examples exist of mutually 
beneficial economic activities for Georgians and Abkhaz 
including the Enguri Hydroelectric Power Station, 
which generates 1.3 million kw from the Inguri River 
and marks the administrative border of the conflict zone. 
The reservoir is located in Georgia while the plant and 
distribution transformer is in Abkhazia. 60% of the 
electricity goes to Georgia with the balance transmitted 
to Abkhazia.
The Khudoni Dam and Hydro Station is located 40 
km upriver from the Inguri Dam. Started in the 1980s 
by the Soviets, construction is about 30% complete. 
Finishing construction will cost $2 billion. Given the 
site location and the development of Georgia's high 
voltage transmission system, generated electricity could 
be transmitted to Krasnodarsky Kray, a region in Russia 
with Sochi as its largest city, or to Turkey.
Black Sea Infrastructure Development proposes 
the Enguri Sand and Gravel Export Project, which will 
dredge the dry-bed of the Inguri River 62 km from 
Anaklia and 40 km upstream from the Khudoni site. Up to 
500 million cubic meters of product will be immediately 
loaded onto barges and transported downriver, bound for 
markets across the Black Sea where gravel for cement is 
urgently required.
Suitcase trade of commodities and agricultural goods 
is conducted by many of the 1,800 persons who cross 
the Enguri River each day. Medical equipment and 
pharmaceuticals are also procured in Georgia for sale in 
Abkhazia. As a member of the World Trade Organization
10. Beslan Baratelia. “Economic Development of Disadvantaged 
Areas of Abkhazia.” Georgian and Abkhaz Perspectives on Human 
Security and Development in Conflict Related Areas. CITpax. Toledo 
International Center for Peace. May 2009. pp. 77-82.
(WTO), Georgian imports goods at a much lower cost 
than Russia does making Georgian-origin products less 
costly. Agro-enterprise activities have involved tea, 
tomatoes, citrus and apple products, and hazelnuts.
There are many examples of commercial contact 
as a tool for conflict mitigation: the Southeast Europe 
Economic Cooperation Initiative promoted stability 
after Yugoslavia's breakup. The Greek-Turkish Business 
Forum catalyzed bilateral agreements on trade, tourism, 
maritime and environmental issues. And trade between 
China and Taiwan has helped reduce tension across the 
Taiwan Straits.
Sochi Olympics
The 2014 Sochi Olympics, just 35 km from Abkhazia, 
represent another opportunity for economic cooperation 
benefiting Georgians and Abkhaz, as well as Russia. The 
Games are in serious trouble due to construction delays 
and cost overruns. Originally budgeted at $8-13 billion, 
the current cost is estimated at $37 billion.
There are serious obstacles to building facilities for 
the Games. Since the Sochi area lacks raw materials, 
barges are bringing sand and gravel from Turkey. Russia 
has tried to build a port at Sochi, but has encountered 
engineering difficulties. Even when raw materials 
are available, laborers are in short supply. Abkhaz 
are concerned about the surge of up to 50,000 foreign 
workers, who will be employed to build the Olympic 
Village and related facilities. They are also worried 
about the ecological impact of a huge Russian cement 
plant under consideration for Abkhazia at a cost of $170 
million.11
Transport and hospitality infrastructure are also major 
problems. Sochi also lacks a major airport. Russia hopes 
to use Sukhumi's Babushera Airport as a transport hub. 
However, the GoG has protested to the International Civil 
Aviation Organization. Facing a crisis in hotel capacity, 
Russia wrote the International Olympic Committee to 
propose that athletes stay on boats in the Black Sea.
Civic Initiatives
People-to-people activities - also called “track two 
activities” - represent a form of cooperation engaging 
business representatives and other non-governmental 
actors. People-to-people activities create space for civic 
engagement while building bridges through practical 
forms of cooperation that, based on dialogue and joint 
analysis, derive mutual benefit. They can also help 
transform conflict conditions through confidence building
11. International Crisis Group. “Abkhazia: Deepening Dependence.” 
February 26, 2010, p. 8.
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by reducing misperceptions and combating negative 
stereotypes that undermine mutual understanding. 
People-to-people activities are not a substitute for 
official diplomacy, but they can change the climate in 
which diplomatic efforts occur. They can also add value 
by developing innovative policy initiatives based on 
common approaches to shared problems.12
Track two activities involving Georgians and Abkhaz 
are constrained by bitterness and distrust. They also suffer 
from inadequate resources, as well as failures by both 
the Georgian and Abkhaz sides to create a permissive 
environment for interaction. Abkhaz especially oppose 
activities that can be manipulated to advance Georgia's 
goal of reintegration. Abkhaz civil society representatives 
believe that the GoG's current engagement strategy is 
too politicized and has little chance of occurring. They 
prefer regional frameworks for cooperation on business 
and environmental issues such as the Caucasian Forum 
on Provincial Cities in the South Caucasus.13
Going forward, the GoG is exploring innovative 
ways to facilitate freedom of movement. It plans to 
offer laissez-passer travel documents and identification 
cards to Abkhaz. That could make travel easier and 
allow Abkhaz to benefit from social services available 
in Georgia, such as health care and education, which are 
of higher quality and lower cost than in Abkhazia. The 
GoG also hopes that social interaction will help reduce 
tensions and set the stage for rapprochement over the 
long-term.
Abkhaz Perspective
This section of the article describes Abkhaz 
perspectives. It is based on the author's meetings 
in Sukhumi with Abkhaz authorities, members of 
parliament, and civil society. While the author does not 
necessarily associate himself with the statements in this 
section, they are provided so that the reader may have a 
fuller understanding of the divergent views of Georgians 
and Abkhaz.
Abkhaz authorities, including Prime Minister Sergei 
Shamba, have many grievances. Most of all, they deeply 
resent Georgia's Law on Occupied Territories. Shamba 
maintains that the GoG rejects “new realities.” He 
complains about Georgia's efforts to block air, land, 
and sea access, and its lobbying of Western countries to 
prevent visas from being issued to Abkhaz with Russian 
passports. Abkhaz are also upset by the GoG's efforts to
12. This paragraph draws on “Confidence building and the role of 
civil society as a key element for conflict resolution” by Jonathan 
Cohen. Conciliation Resources. January 2010.
13. Interview by the author with Liana Kerchiela in Sukhumi, May
11, 2010.
disrupt commercial contacts citing its undermining of 
deals with Nokia and Benetton.
In addition to the Law on Occupied Territories, 
Abkhaz authorities criticize the State Strategy for 
referring to “occupied territories, de-occupation and non-
recognition.” According to Shamba, the State Strategy 
is “a device to bring Abkhazia back to Georgia.” Nadir 
Bitieff, the National Security Adviser, maintains: “If 
Abkhazia is built and then decides to rejoin Georgia, so 
be it. But that won't happen. It's too late.”
They dismiss confidence-building measures as 
“unrealistic.” Deep distrust between Georgians and 
Abkhaz is rooted in historical memory. According 
to Shamba, “We barely survived. Georgians stole 
everything - cars, factory equipment, furniture in houses 
- after attacking us in 1992.” Abkhaz authorities want 
an agreement with the GoG on the non-use of force as 
a first step to restoring trust. The GoG rejects Abkhaz 
overtures; it believes that entering into an agreement 
with the Abkhaz authorities would imply recognition. 
Instead, the GoG offers to sign a non-aggression pact 
with Russia, but only after Russian troops withdraw from 
occupied territories.
Regarding Russia's role, Shamba adds: “Why engage 
[with Georgia] when we have a strategic partnership with 
great and huge Russia? We are ready for relations with all 
countries except Georgia.”14 He points out, “By isolating 
us, the international community creates the situation 
where we are dependent on Russia and then criticizes us 
for being a puppet regime.”
Shamba welcomes the “breathing space” provided 
by Russian troops. “The constant threat of war forced 
us to spend all our resources on security. Now people 
have confidence for the future. They know aggression 
will be prevented.” He describes the Russian presence 
as an economic opportunity. “Help, tourists, television 
all come from Russia.” Regarding “bilateral agreements” 
allowing Russian bases in Abkhazia, “We had very tough 
arguments with Russia and always tried to defend our 
national interests.” He adds wryly, “We have a long 
history of fighting foreign domination. Maybe that is 
why there are only 100,000 of us.”
Batal Tabagua, head of the Central Election 
Commission, represents Abkhaz hardliners with deep 
antipathy towards the West. “The United States is our 
main enemy,” he says; “Everybody is afraid of the U.S., 
so it thinks it can do what it wants. It threatens countries 
that want to recognize us.” Shamba tries to temper
14. Abkhaz perspectives are drawn primarily from interviews with 
Prime Minister Sergey Shamba in Sukhumi on May 11 and 12, 2010. 
Other persons interviewed include Nadir Bitieff (Adviser to the 
President), Maxim Gunjia (Deputy Foreign Minister), Batal Tabagua 
(Head, Central Election Commission), the Chairman of the Abkhaz 
Parliament's Defense Committee, and NGO representatives associated 
with the Center on Humanitarian Issues.
20
THE HARRIMAN REVIEW
Tabagua's comments adding, “There is no hatred at the 
societal level. We have very good attitudes towards the 
American people and culture.”
Turkey is seen as both an alternative and additional 
partner to Russia. Turks currently come to Abkhazia 
via Sochi. Abkhaz authorities want direct ferry service 
between Trabzon and Sukhumi. Shamba plans to set up a 
special ministry to encourage repatriation of the Abkhaz 
Diaspora from Turkey. He wants to replicate Israel's 
“Aliyah” policy. Abkhaz authorities also plan to study 
how other non-recognized states have gained credibility 
by opening trade and cultural liaison offices.
Abkhaz feel that time is on their side; they believe 
that international recognition is inevitable. Bitieff 
acknowledges that communications are the key to better 
understanding. “We want Georgia to recognize us. That 
would allow refugees to come home or get compensated.” 
He also believes that normalizing relations with Georgia 
would be a boon for business. “The more money comes, 
the stronger our civil society.” With pride he adds, “It's 
more free here [than in Georgia]. Abkhazia is an open 
society that wants to interact with the world. Georgian 
society is more like Russia's — Bolshevik and imperial.”
Stakeholders
Opportunities for cooperation between Georgians and 
Abkhaz require the encouragement of major stakeholders 
whose interests are affected by developments in Georgia 
and the South Caucasus.
The United States
Affinity between Georgia and the United States goes 
back to the period when Eduard Shevardnadze served 
as the Soviet Union's foreign minister. Shevardnadze 
attained iconic status in the West for his pivotal role 
managing the dissolution of the USSR, as well as 
negotiating German reunification. Shevardnadze served 
as head of state from 1995 to 2003. Under his leadership, 
Georgia steered a pro-Western course, becoming both 
ally and friend of the United States.
Georgia's location makes it an important trans- 
Eurasia energy transit country. The East-West Corridor 
transports vital oil and natural gas supplies from the 
Caspian via Georgia to Western markets. The Baku- 
Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline cost $3.5 billion and now delivers 
a million barrels of oil each day to Western markets. The 
South Caucasus gas pipeline, which follows the same 
route, and the smaller Baku-Tbilisi-Supsa line are other 
Caspian pipelines not under Russia's control. Estimated 
to cost $12 billion, the Nabucco pipeline will expand 
trans-Caspian projects by transporting natural gas from 
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan through Georgia to Turkey. 
These supply routes are essential to diversifying energy 
sources for consumers in the West.
Georgia emerged as a high-value ally after the events 
of September 11, 2001. President George W. Bush and 
Saakashvili developed a close personal relationship based 
on shared values and Georgia's support of Bush's war on 
terror. Saakashvili embraced liberal democracy after the 
“Rose Revolution of 2003.” Representing the possibility 
of a democratic post-Soviet state outside of the Baltics, 
Bush heralded Georgia as a beacon of democracy.
Since 2007, however, Georgia has struggled to 
consolidate its democratic development. Addressing 
Georgia' parliament, Vice President Joseph R. Biden, 
Jr. called for “significant, concrete steps that need to 
be taken to deepen democracy.” He added, “Your Rose 
Revolution will only be complete when government is 
transparent, accountable, and fully participatory; when 
issues are debated within this chamber, not on the 
streets; when you fully address constitutional issues 
regarding the balance of power between the parliament 
and the executive branch, and leveling your electoral 
playing field; when the media is totally independent and 
professional, provide people with the information to 
make informed decisions, and to hold their government 
accountable for the decisions it makes; [and] when the 
courts are free from outside influence and the rule of law 
is firmly established.”15
Regarding security cooperation, the Pentagon 
launched a Train and Equip Program to enhance Georgia's 
counter-terrorism capabilities in April 2002. Georgia 
was one of the first countries to join the multinational 
force in Iraq. The United States led efforts to establish 
the Partnership for Peace Program between NATO and 
Georgia. The Bush administration also championed 
Georgia's NATO membership. A decision on MAP for 
Georgia was deferred at NATO's Bucharest Summit on 
April 4, 2008. However, the final communique affirmed, 
“We agreed today that these countries [Georgia and 
Ukraine] will become members of NATO.”
Though the Obama administration continues security 
cooperation with the GoG, it declined Georgia's request 
for assistance in rearming after the 2008 War. Instead, 
it is working with the GoG to modernize its military, 
focusing on training, planning, and organization of 
Georgian forces to be deployed in Afghanistan.16 * *In 
response to President Barack Obama's appeal for more 
forces in Afghanistan, Georgia pledged approximately 
1,000 troops. The southern line of the Northern 
Distribution Network supplying troops in Afghanistan 
runs through Georgia. The GoG also provides over-flight 
rights to NATO. Adopted in 2009, the “U.S.-Georgia
15. Remarks by Vice President Joseph Biden to the Georgian Parlia-
ment, July 23, 2009.
16. Cory Welt. “How Strategic is the US-Georgia Strategic Partner-
ship?” Presented at the Harriman Institute, Columbia University.
March 11, 2010, p. 2.
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Charter on Strategic Partnership” affirms support for 
Georgia's “legitimate security and defense needs” as well 
as “regional peace and stability.” It does not, however, 
provide a U.S. security guarantee.17
U.S.-Russia relations have rebounded since their 
low point during the Bush administration. Pressing the 
“reset button” has enabled the U.S. and Russia to work 
more effectively together on a range of issues, including 
non-proliferation as well as multilateral initiatives before 
the UN Security Council. The Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty was signed on April 8, 2010. A new cooperative 
approach to Russia was announced at NATO's Lisbon 
meeting in November 2010. To assuage the GoG's 
concerns, U.S. officials affirm that rapprochement with 
Russia does not come at Georgia's expense. According 
to Biden, “We stand against the 19th century notion of 
spheres of influence . We will not recognize Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia as independent states. And we urge the 
world not to recognize them as independent states. We 
call upon Russia to honor its international commitments 
clearly specified in the August 12 ceasefire agreement, 
including withdrawal of forces to their pre-conflict 
positions, and ultimately out of Georgia.”18
While the strategic partnership between Georgia 
and the U.S. endures, today's relations are more 
straightforward and based on strategic objectives. These 
include preventing conflict between Russia and Georgia 
that would put the U.S. in a position of having to take 
sides.
Russia
After recognizing Abkhazia, Russia signed a 
“bilateral military cooperation agreement” with Abkhazia 
formalizing the deployment of 3,800 Russian troops and 
1,000 FSB members on the administrative border.19 In 
addition, Russia and the Abkhaz authorities signed a 49- 
year lease for the naval base at Ochamchira, where naval/ 
coast guard forces will be stationed, and for the Bombora 
Air Base near Gudauta where 1,700 troops will be 
posted. Beginning in August 2009, the Sevastopol-based 
Russian Navy started patrolling the Black Sea to prevent 
Georgian Coast Guard vessels from interdicting Turkish 
ships. Russia deployed sophisticated S-300 missiles to 
Abkhazia on the two-year anniversary of the war, which 
further heightened tensions.
On his first post-war trip to Abkhazia, Putin pledged 
$470 million to support the Russian armed forces in 
Abkhazia and reinforce the administrative dividing line at 
the Enguri River. Putin also announced $340 million for
17. Ibid.
18. Remarks by Vice President Joe Biden to the Georgian Parliament, 
July 23, 2009.
19. Ibid.
social support and as stimulus for the Abkhaz economy, 
including $65 million in direct budgetary support in 2009 
and a slightly higher amount in 2010. In addition, Russia 
agreed to pay $17 million in pensions to Abkhaz holding 
Russian passports.20 Russia's assistance came at a time 
when its economy is adversely affected by the global 
economic crisis and declining energy prices.
Russia is a dominant force in Abkhazia's economy. 
Approximately 80% of all goods consumed in Abkhazia 
come from Russia.21 Russia is financing the set-up of 
Abkhazia's banking system.
Russia's state railway is leasing the Abkhaz railroad. 
Negotiations are underway for Russia to assume 
operation of the airport and a port near Sukhumi.22 Major 
Russian television stations are broadcast in Abkhazia 
and Internet access in Abkhazia is provided via Russian 
Internet service providers. Prominent Russians have 
acquired properties on the Black Sea coast, including 
the oligarch Oleg Deripaska and Moscow's Mayor Yuri 
Luzhkov, who built a mansion on a spectacular bluff in 
Gagra.
Though Abkhaz welcome their strategic partnership 
with Russia, they also have a long history of resisting 
Russian imperialism. Abkhaz want independence. They 
do not want to be assimilated or annexed by Russia. The 
Russian State Duma passed a resolution on February 
17, 2010 heralding “the 200th anniversary of Russia's 
patronage over Abkhazia.”23
Russia's relations with Georgia remain tense and 
acrimonious. Though Georgia and Russia severed 
diplomatic relations after the 2008 War, each maintains 
an interests section at the Swiss embassies in Moscow 
and Tbilisi. The GoG maintains it cannot resume relations 
until Russia abides by ceasefire commitments. Russia's 
disparaging of Saakashvili further impedes resuming 
relations. The GoG adamantly insists that it will not 
agree to restore full diplomatic or consular relations until 
Russia rescinds its recognition of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia and withdraws troops from these territories. The 
GoG believes that normalizing relations would send the 
wrong signal to countries it is lobbying to hold the line 
on non-recognition. According to Medvedev, Russia will 
eventually restore relations with Georgia, but not until 
Saakashvili leaves office.24 Georgia and Russia are at 
loggerheads; Moscow has no intention to compromise.
20. International Crisis Group. “Abkhazia: Deepening Dependence.” 
February 26, 2010, p. 6.
21. Ibid.
22. Isabel Gorst. “Moscow Tightens Grip on Abkhazia.” FT.com. 
February 17, 2010.
23. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. February 17, 2010, www.rferl. 
org/content/Russia_Gains_Military_Base_In_Abkhazia/196545.html.




Despite acrimony, Russia remains a major investor 
in Georgia. Most Georgians want the GoG to take a 
more business-like approach towards Russia. A public 
opinion poll on April 11-26, 2010 found that 52% of 
those surveyed disapprove of Georgia's current policy 
towards Russia; 82% support a resumption of direct 
flights between Tbilisi and Moscow.25
Turkey
Turkey has extensive ties to both Russia and Georgia. 
As part of Turkey's “Zero Problems with Neighbors 
Policy,” President Abdullah Gul visited Moscow and 
Tbilisi several times in 2010 to mediate a rapprochement. 
Though Turkey's proposal for a South Caucasus Stability 
Pact floundered, Turkey believes it is well positioned to 
act as mediator given its close ties with each.
Medvedev and Gul signed 17 cooperation agreements 
including an agreement on nuclear power on May 12,
2010. As a result, bilateral trade volume currently valued 
at $30 billion is expected to surpass $100 billion. Most 
of the increase will come from the energy sector via a 
pipeline from Samsun on the Black Sea to Ceyhan on 
the Mediterranean. “South Stream” further consolidates 
Russia's energy influence in Eurasia advancing one 
of Moscow's strategic objectives: an outlet to the 
Mediterranean via Turkey.
Turkish construction workers are employed 
across Russia, and Turkish construction companies 
were contracted to build Russia's military bases in 
Abkhazia. The Trabzon-Sochi maritime link is important 
commercially. About 5.5 million Russian tourists visit 
Turkey each year; tourism will increase with plans to lift 
visa requirements for visits of less than a month.26
Georgia is Turkey's window to the Caucasus and the 
Caspian countries. Turkish hubs on the Black Sea coast 
are linked to Batumi in Ajara, a former Ottoman province 
now serving as the primary East-West route from Turkey 
to Central Asia. Turkey is one of Georgia's top trading 
partners. Trade volume was $1 billion in 2009. Turkey 
ranks second in Foreign Direct Investment valued at 
$165 million in 2008. Turkey is Georgia's largest export 
market, accounting for 17.6% of exports in 2008. The 
value of goods imported from Turkey by Georgia is 
14.9% of total imports.27 The two countries signed a Free 
Trade Agreement and cooperate militarily via weapons 
sales from Turkey to Georgia and training of Georgian 
military personnel.
In addition, Turkish freighters supplied Sukhumi 
despite efforts by Georgia's Coast Guard to impose
25. “Poll Shows Decrease in Support for NATO Membership.” The 
Georgian Times. May 10, 2010, p. 4.
26. Sebnem Arsu, “Turkey's Pact With Russia Will Give It Nuclear 
Plant,” The New York Times, May 13, 2010, p. A12.
27. CIA Factbook 2008.
a maritime blockage. Under the Law on Occupied 
Territories, the Georgian Coast Guard arrested three 
ships by mid-2009 carrying goods between Turkey 
and Abkhazia.28 At least 300,000 ethnic Abkhaz, even 
more ethnic Georgians, and untold numbers of North 
Caucasians (mostly Circassians) live in Turkey.29 As 
a result of this diaspora, Turkey is Abkhazia's second 
largest trading partner behind Russia.
European Union
Georgia currently participates in the EU's Eastern 
Partnership Initiative (as does Ukraine, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Moldova and Belarus). Georgian passport 
holders benefit from a Visa Facilitation Regime 
with the EU. A Visa Liberalization Dialogue is also 
underway. Georgia also enjoys GSP+ (General System 
of Preferences), allowing it to export without tax or quota 
to EU Member States.
Additionally, Georgia is negotiating a Comprehensive 
Free Trade Agreement with the EU. Its advantages are 
mostly political, sending a positive signal to international 
financial institutions and private investors. In May, the 
EC issued a directive allowing the start of negotiations 
on a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) for 
all countries in the South Caucasus “when conditions are 
correct.” Georgia is at the head of the queue.
Russia resents the EU's involvement in Georgia and 
its staunch non-recognition policy towards Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia. Russia impeded deployment of 
the EU Monitory Mission with FSB forces. The EU 
also participates diplomatically as a co-chair of the 
Geneva process. Russia is suspicious of the EU. It sees 
the Eastern Partnership Initiative as a way of weaning 
countries from its influence. If Georgia gets an SAA, 
then Russia's efforts to assert control over its near abroad 
will be further undermined.
Recommendations
This article presents a hopeful, yet steely-eyed view of 
the situation. Collaborative activities can only go forward 
with concurrence by the GoG and Abkhaz authorities. 
Commercial contact will not occur in the current climate 
unless both sides make a strategic decision that it is in 
their interests to allow it.
Georgia's State Strategy and Action Plan embody the 
right approach. Engagement addresses immediate basic 
human needs, while potentially reducing tensions. It 
can also potentially diminish the distrust and acrimony 
that pervades relations between Georgians and Abkhaz, 
thereby setting the stage for long-term rapprochement.
28. “Turkey May Help Abkhazia Reintegrate With Georgia Through 
Direct Trade,” The Georgian Times, May 10, 2010, p. 6.
29. Milliyet “Unlu Portreler,” January 18, 1996.
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Practical benefits of the State Strategy can be maximized 
by depoliticizing it and by emphasizing regional 
cooperation.
Engagement must take into account intractable, 
core positions on all sides. Georgia wants to engage 
without legitimizing the Abkhaz authorities or seeming 
to support Abkhazia's goal of independence. Abkhaz will 
only engage if engagement does not undermine their goal 
to gain greater global recognition as an independent and 
sovereign State. Progress requires a flexible, long-term 
and realistic approach. It must be based on the GoG's 
recognition that Georgia's interests are best served when 
Abkhaz prosper via commercial contact with Georgians 
as well as through regional links in the Caucasus and 
with littoral states of the Black Sea. The GoG is adamant 
about non-recognition. Therefore, it will only pursue 
this course if it believes that infrastructure and regional 
economic development do not advance recognition 
efforts by the Abkhaz authorities.
Russia is indispensable to Abkhazia. It provides 
security, funds, and access. While Abkhaz recognize 
Russia's indispensable role, they are wary of being 
annexed by Russia or having their identity overwhelmed 
by Russians. It is in the interest of both Georgia and 
Abkhaz to strengthen Abkhazia, thereby reducing the 
possibility of absorption by Russia. A self-confident and 
empowered Abkhazia may be more willing to discuss 
some kind of association with Georgia in the future.
There is not a lot of common ground. The delicate 
balance between Georgian and Abkhaz interests could 
easily be upset without gradual and carefully calibrated 
steps that benefit all parties, including Russia. Even 
when everyone benefits, there is a question that hangs 
over cooperation between Georgians and Abkhazi: does 
Russia have incentive to allow it?
Business proposals
Business is the common language. There are several 
opportunities with the potential to derive mutual benefit. 
Most noteworthy is the Inguri Sand and Gravel Export 
Project (and related activities). This private sector 
initiative can be launched immediately as a win-win for 
Georgia, Abkhazia, and Russia.
Pending negotiations and agreement with affected 
parties, the Project will produce raw material urgently 
needed by Russia for construction of the Olympic 
facilities. Abkhaz will receive royalties in exchange for 
guaranteeing security and safe passage of barges down 
the Inguri to the Black Sea. Georgia will benefit from 
the upgrading of roads, railways, and nearby bridges 
by the developer. In addition to creating 250 jobs, the 
Project also presents an opportunity for tourism and 
agro-industries.
This article proposes an enterprise called “Black 
Sea Resorts,” which would build and operate a hotel, 
gaming and recreational facility at the site. As part of its 
cruise and tourism package, Black Sea Resorts would 
also develop facilities in Western Georgia and Russia, 
including locations that could be used for the Sochi 
Olympics.
Bridges and infrastructure at the dredging site will 
facilitate commercial contact between Georgians and 
Abkhaz. Restoring tea plantations in Gali and setting up 
a tea collection and processing center on the east side of 
the Inguri would facilitate interaction. The same model 
could be explored for other agro-industries linking 
Georgians and Abkhaz (e.g. hazelnuts, tomatoes, citrus, 
and apple products). In addition, it would be desirable 
to establish the equivalent of a free trade zone near the 
project site where other commodities, machinery, and 
equipment could be sold.
The Project's realization would be a cause for 
celebration. On this occasion, Yevgeny Yevtushenko 
could participate in a collaborative cultural event such 
as a “poetry concert” for an audience of Georgians and 
Abkhaz. Yevtushenko is revered as an artist and moral 
icon by Georgians and Abkhaz alike. Now 80 years old, 
he has ties to Abkhazia, where he kept a home that was 
destroyed during the 1992-93 conflict.
Policy Proposals
The following policy proposals promote contact 
between Abkhazia and the international community, 
including Georgia.
• Upgrade the Action Plan: The donor community 
can assist by establishing an “Action Plan 
Affinity Group” offering resources to private 
sector initiatives in the form of project financing, 
loan guarantees, risk insurance, and grants for 
worker training and other benefits. The Action 
Plan can best be achieved through a more 
relaxed regulatory environment which calibrates 
modifications in the Law on Occupied Territories 
with Sukhumi's cooperation. Without a quid pro 
quo, the United States could provide Georgia 
with a Free Trade Agreement as incentive to 
modify the Law on Occupied Territories.
• Empower the Coordinating Commission: A 
reliable communications and liaison channel 
exchanging information and assisting project 
development is essential to implementing the 
Action Plan. Led by a Special Representative on 
Shared Interests, the Coordinating Commission 
should have the tacit approval of both the GoG 
and Abkhaz authorities. However, it must not 
accept funds from either side lest financing
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from one compromise its credibility with the 
other. The cost of staff and facilities should be 
fully covered by a member of the international 
donor community, such as the EU, that has 
experience funding activities in Abkhazia. To 
ensure the Commission's independence, it could 
be established under UN auspices.
• Enhance freedom of movement: It would be best 
if the Abkhaz authorities had “no objection” 
when Abkhaz travel in Georgia or internationally 
using laissez-passer documents issued by the 
GoG. If they do object, the GoG needs a fallback 
position: allow mutual recognition of civil 
documents, such as birth certificates, driving 
licenses, and professional degrees, to allow 
freedom of movement and facilitate commercial 
contact between Abkhaz and Georgians, 
including those displaced by the conflict.
• Reduce the isolation of Abkhaz: Civil society 
interaction can identify practical areas for 
cooperation, thereby building confidence. 
Donor funds should be allocated to dialogue 
initiatives engaging Georgians and Abkhaz. 
In addition, the U.S. can help connect Abkhaz 
civil society with the international community 
via existing Fulbright scholarships, IREX 
university exchanges, and participation in 
the State Department's International Visitors 
Program. Abkhazia's isolation would be further 
reduced through the participation of civil society 
representatives in the “Forum on Provincial 
Cities in the South Caucasus.”
• Expand Turkey's role: The GoG should waive 
customs requirements for Turkish cargo ships 
putting into Abkhaz ports. Rather than requiring 
them to dock first in Poti or Batumi, a notification 
protocol could be developed informing the 
GoG of their cargo and route. Links between 
Turks and Abkhaz would also be enhanced by 
developing a direct land route from Turkey to 
the Gali region, as well as via restoration of 
the Vesyoloye-Sukhumi railway linking Russia, 
Abkhazia, and other parts of Georgia. Opening 
commercial ferry service between Sukhumi and 
Trabzon would stimulate trade and tourism. 
Ankara should assure the GoG that direct contact 
between Turks and Abkhaz does not represent a 
process of “creeping recognition.”
Conclusion
It would be wrong to underestimate Russia's role in 
fomenting conflict and sustaining divisions. But just as 
Russia is a source of the problem, it can also contribute 
to progress. Improved Georgia-Abkhaz relations can be
achieved by improving relations between Georgia and 
Russia.
The GoG currently rejects cooperation until Russia 
rescinds recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and 
withdraws forces from occupied territories. The GoG 
would be best served through a non-confrontational 
approach. It should not let its national pride interfere 
with its national interests. When Russia lifts its boycott 
of Georgian water, wine and other goods, Georgia should 
support Russia's membership in the WTO. Russia's 
membership is also in Georgia's interest as it will require 
Russia to abide by WTO regulations and provide a 
forum to redress trade embargos. Resuming direct flights 
between Tbilisi and Moscow would be a step towards 
normal travel and trade relations between Georgia and 
Russia.
As Georgia's strong supporter, the United States 
is best placed to counsel Georgia on ways to mitigate 
conflict and move forward. More than “strategic 
patience,” the United States should proactively promote 
peace and progress in Georgia and the region. Anything 
less could be interpreted as abandoning Georgia to 
Russia's sphere of influence, which would be detrimental 
to both Georgia and the United States.
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